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Trade Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
by Glenn W White*
If the United States had a strong trade balance and was concerned that
its trading partners could not survive unless it redressed the situation, it
would have found a device for solving the problem when it adopted the
Tax Reform Act of 19861 (herein referred to as TRA 1986). Of course,
the fact is that the United States has a terrible trade balance and should
be doing everything possible to remedy the situation. That being the
case, we have from a trade perspective, adopted a very bad national pol-
icy. Even if Canada snatches defeat from the jaws of a potentially very
significant victory by emulating the U.S. tax legislation, the United States
will still be a long way from being home free and dry, because not all of
its foreign competitors are likely to forego such a splendid opportunity to
enhance their position at our expense. Where did we go wrong?
From an international trade perspective: We enhanced the availa-
bility of the U.S. market by lowering the taxes on sales and service activ-
ity.2  At the same time, the new act decreased personal tax rates,3 and
penalized personal savings thus increasing the propensity to spend and
consume.4  To further complicate this, we put severe penalties on the
employment of capital in the United States.5
Let's examine all of these provisions and their effect on the opportu-
nities for trade between the United States and Canada. Canada has a
relatively favorable three year capital cost recovery system for manufac-
turing assets.6 This is contrasted with the pre-Tax Reform Act of 19867
system of Accelerated Capital Recovery System (ACRS) which provided
a five year write off on what is best described as a straight line basis.
When the U.S. allowance of a ten percent investment tax credit was
taken into account the U.S. capital cost recovery system wasn't too bad.
* Director of Taxes, The Dow Chemical Company.
I P.L. 99-514, 99 Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). Now the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (I.R.C. of
1986).
2 New corporate rates: 1987 - 40%; 1988 and after - 34%. The other changes in the law
effectively increase the taxes on employment of capital.
3 New individual rates: 1987 - maximum 38.5%; 1988 - 28% with clawback producing a 34%
rate for a strata of income roughly between $71,900 - 149,250 for a married couple.
4 Differential rates of tax on capital gains and tax deductible contributions to IRAs were re-
pealed. Use of 401(k) and many retirement related benefits were curtailed.
5 The investment tax credit was repealed. Depreciation on most capital assets slowed and re-
search and development credit diminished.
6 CAN. CONs. REGS. ch. 945 (1978).
7 I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1986).
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Even in the relatively sparse economic years of the 1980-84 period, in-
vestment in plant and equipment in the U.S. economy remained at rea-
sonable levels.8 With the loss of the investment tax credit, together with
the lengthening of lives for depreciable assets for most of U.S. industry,
the U.S. capital cost recovery system will be one of the slowest among
the major industrial countries. 9 The cost of capital for equipment under
the 1986 law will increase by 62.2% according to the Economic Report
of the President. l°
This will, in all likelihood, result in diminished U.S. investment.
Where is that diminution of investment most likely to occur? The benefit
of lower tax rates will favor the employment of assets that produce the
highest rate of return. This is so because the lower tax rate most strongly
affects the businesses having high profit margins.
Businesses producing commodity type assets with low marginal
rates of return will obtain little benefit from the lower tax rate. At the
same time, they will be strongly affected by the loss of those provisions
that tend to mitigate the bias of a tax on net income against the employ-
ment of capital. Those who favored 1986 Tax Reform Act argued that
the most efficient allocation of national resources will occur only if high
return projects are accepted. This disregards the fact that those rela-
tively low rate return assets that produce basic commodities like iron,
steel, aluminum, chemicals, and refined petroleum products are vital to
the economy, and unless those production facilities are renewed and
made technologically current, the implications for the foreign trade pic-
ture are not at all attractive. It is not likely that a large economy like
that of the United States can operate efficiently without indigenous pro-
duction of basic building block commodities.
The economy needs to participate fully in the advanced technologies
that are being developed today. Examination of the structure of the new
U.S. tax law, however, gives us little reason to rejoice about the growth
of the new high-tech companies either. To the extent those new enter-
prises need to employ substantial amounts of capital, at least in compari-
son to their early profitability, they will find the imposition of the new
alternative minimum tax to be an impediment to their expansion. The
new alternative minimum tax falls most heavily on high growth rate
firms." New investment should be anticipated in high profit margin
8 G. BOSKIN, IMPACT OF THE 1981-82 INVESTMENT INCENTIVES ON BUSINESS FIXED IN-
VESTMENT, (1985).
9 ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE PRESENT VALUE OF
COST RECOVERY ALLOWANCES FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF EQUIPMENT, (1986), (This special study
was commissioned by the Coalition on Jobs, Growth and Int'l Competitiveness, for the American
Council for Capital Formation.)
10 COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, Jan. 29, 1987
(Daily Executive Report (BNA) Special Supplement #20, Jan. 29, 1987).
11 Harter, How Tax Reform Would Affect Companies With Different Growth And Profitability
Characteristics, 31 TAX NOTES 297 (1986).
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businesses by firms that are already established and who themselves have
high profit margins.
This bill protects the established firms in two ways First, it does
not impose its burden on capital, on old capital. Thus, new entrants,
either by way of expansion or new entry, are discouraged. Second, the
established firm that already has a tax liability that is only partially offset
by the new expansion will not feel the effects of the alternative minimum
tax.
What then are the implications of this for trans-border trade? Man-
ufacturing outside the United States for sales inside the United States
should be relatively attractive. This is particularly so if the effective tax
rate on the foreign manufacturing activity is low. "Effective tax rate" is
the critical term here. The statutory rate of tax for this purpose is imma-
terial, or at least relatively so. The impact of the new U.S. tax law is to
impose a relatively high tax on capital. Countries that elect to impose
relatively lower rates of tax on capital will have an edge on firms located
in the United States who are their direct competitors.
Looking at TRA 1986 from another aspect, it is worthwhile to note
that profits from selling goods in the United States will enjoy a relatively
low rate of tax by world standards. The firm located in Canada with
manufacturing facilities will find their southern neighbor an attractive
outlet for Canadian produced goods. This position is further enhanced
by the fact that individual taxes were reduced by TRA 1986 by about
$120 billion over the next five years.1 2 This pumps a fair amount of con-
sumption into the economy. If one were to assume that the rates of tax
in the United States would stay down long-term, there would be even
greater cause for rejoicing in Canada, because slower industrial growth in
the United States should make more of the market available to imported
goods.
Viewing any international issue on the basis of taxes alone is not
very realistic. So it is in this instance. There will be other effects includ-
ing changes in the relative value of the U.S. dollar as a result of more
imports that will tend to offset the availability of the market generated by
taxes in the United States. Moreover, it might not be sound to expect the
U.S. statutory tax rate to stay low indefinitely. Already there is concern
thai the rates should be raised for high income individuals and corpora-
tions. 3 If the United States increases its statutory rate of tax while re-
taining this broad based levy, it will have what is probably the highest
effective rate of corporate income tax in the industrialized world.
Another factor making an even more consumption-oriented econ-
omy than we have had until now is the enactment of provisions that
lessen the propensity for individuals to save and invest. Tax deferred in-
12 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-865, Table A.I.
13 DAILY TAX REPORT, 236 (BNA) Dec. 9, 1986, p. LL-2; DAILY TAX REPORT, 176 (BNA)
Sept. 5, 1986, p. G-5; DAILY TAX REPORT, 8 (BNA) Jan. 13, 1987, p. S-9.
3
White: Trade Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1987
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
vestments in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) have been re-
pealed. These accounts have had a strong effect on middle-income
America. 4 In addition, there is some uncertainty of what happens to the
funds that otherwise would have flowed into tax sheltered investments.
Whatever deficiencies they had, and they were many, those investments
did attract dollars that now will flow elsewhere, some probably to con-
sumption. Along with the other changes that were wrought by TRA
1986, was the repeal of any tax rate differential on capital gains. Begin-
ning in 1988, capital gains will be taxed at ordinary income rates. There
is a preferential rate for capital gains in 1987. Capital losses will only be
recognized against capital gains under the new law. 5 This places an
even higher risk factor on capital investment. The disequal treatment of
gains and losses only serves to heighten the prejudice against savings and
investment. Without being overly paranoid, it is reasonable to point out
that the measures taken have encouraged consumption, not only by plac-
ing more funds in the hands of those most likely to consume, but has also
penalized savings to a degree that will force more consumption.
Under the new law, corporate profits of foreign operations of U.S.
based business will be taxed at 34% for the years after 1987. The impli-
cations of this for transborder trade are several. Investments in foreign
manufacturing operations will be quite attractive if the foreign rate of tax
is low. As noted previously, the Canadian capital cost recovery system is
relatively attractive and provides a low effective rate of tax on manufac-
turing operations. On that basis, it seems almost inevitable that some
manufacturing operations will stray across the border to Canada. There
may be some attractiveness for a non-U.S. based firm to sell through a
U.S. incorporated entity. The build up of business related assets within
the corporation can be financed with its U.S. earnings. This would save
the incremental difference between the United States and Canadian rates
on the affected amounts.
Manufacturing operations almost always bring technology with
them. To transfer technology from the United States to a foreign subsidi-
ary as a part of the subsidiary's capital has not been tax effective since
1984. 16 Transfers of technology have to be made for an ongoing royalty,
unless one is prepared to accept a severe tax burden. The need to receive
a royalty is not at all bad news for transfers to a foreign manufacturing
location for a United States based firm. With the U.S. statutory tax rate
being lower than the rates of tax in most industrialized nations, U.S.
based firms face a situation of being in chronic foreign tax credit limita-
tion. Royalties received from related parties constitute general basket
income for foreign tax credit limitation purposes. 7 A reasonable royalty
14 WISE, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS & SAVINGS, TEXAS & CAPITAL FORMATION,
(National Bureau of Economic Research 1986).
15 I.R.C. § 1211 (1986).
16 I.R.C. § 367(d) (1984).
17 I.R.C. Code, § 904(d)(3)(C) (1986).
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that passes the arm's length test for purposes of the host country's law,
and is thereby deductible, is desirable. It provides low-taxed foreign
source income that serves to offset the limitation problem.
The TRA 1986 has generated a new problem for U.S. firms who
transfer technology to their foreign affiliates. Under the new law, trans-
fers of technology must receive a royalty that is ". .. commensurate with
the income attributable to the intangible."' 8 This provision represents an
abandonment, in the statute, of the principles enunciated in the regula-
tions under I.R.C. § 482.19 This is certainly an abandonment of the
traditional concept of an arm's length measurement. The largest prob-
lem is that it seems to give the revenue authorities a look back at whether
the business has been sufficiently profitable to warrant an additional roy-
alty. Arguably, this is an arm's length standard, although not in the
traditional sense. The capacity this provision has for mischief is not in-
significant. How many tax practitioners would like to go back to the
Canadian tax authorities five years after the fact and argue that the roy-
alty initially charged must now be revised upward by some substantial
amount. Certainly the Revenue Canada authorities will not be amused.
Moreover, one wonders whether the Competent Authority procedure (in
the U.S-Canada Income Tax Treaty) will benefit greatly from this strain.
The U.S. taxpayer may, however, find these adjustments very ac-
ceptable, provided that the additional amount of royalty is deductible by
its subsidiary outside the United States. As a matter of fact, the Internal
Revenue Service may find such adjustments do not generate any addi-
tional revenue because of the foreign tax credit limitation. Unless the
provision is enforced with some consistency, the provision has the capa-
bility of being unfair.
To the extent the provision is enforced, it seems likely to first gener-
ate a lot of effort at the Competent Authority level and then to generate a
substantial amount of litigation. This is because the increase in income
will occur several years after the fact, and the taxpayer will have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the risk. There is a higher
than normal likelihood of a need to litigate if no collateral adjustment is
possible in the other country. One fear corporate tax administrators
have is of the issue that builds up over the years without any ability to
judge its size and earnings impact. This issue is susceptible of generating
that sort of problem.
Apart from the general mischief generated by this provision, it is
disturbing because of its departure from the generally accepted concepts
of arm's length standard as recognized, not just by the United States, but
by other countries as well. This permits the auditor, on an after the fact
basis, to make general adjustments based on a subjective standard under-
stood only by those who have a doctorate in economics. Such adjust-
18 I.R.C. Code, § 482 (1986).
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2.
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ments can be made even if one complied with the requirements governing
transborder transactions. The subjectivity lies in the analysis of what
profit margin might have been acceptable if the taxpayer had known the
profitability of the product before it was licensed. The U.S. Treasury
Department might in other areas like to employ this uncertain subjective
test, whose efficacy will be judged by economists, under theories not nec-
essarily known to the taxpayer at the time of inception of the project.
There is a substantial belief that the solution to this whole set of
problems resides in the use of cost sharing agreements. While those
agreements may work well for some, it is unlikely that they will have
universal appeal. When the regulations under I.R.C. § 86120 were final-
ized, many thought that the use of cost sharing agreements might be the
solution to the problems, at least in the area of research and development
allocations. That did not prove to be the case. There is a strong argu-
ment to use royalties as the means of obtaining return for the enterprise's
research efforts. While it is not particularly apposite in the context of a
Canada-United States situation, the desirability of not having the corpo-
ration's technology generally resident in every country in which one does
business is not so apparent. For example, if the technology is owned by
the local subsidiary company that participates in the cost sharing agree-
ment, the nonpractice of the patent, in the case of patented technology,
may cause it to fall into the public domain. It is unlikely that every
compound will be manufactured in every location. On that basis, tech-
nology of substantial value may pass into the public domain.
In quite a different vein, the question of where research should be
done poses an interesting issue for companies with profitable operations
on both sides of the Canadian-U.S. border. The TRA 1986 temporarily
dealt with one of the more important problems which multinational com-
panies who have substantial research and development activities face.
The operation of Treasury Regulation § 1.861-8, as it relates to research
and experimental expenses, was completely suspended, once more, in
1986 by the 1985 Budget Reconciliation Act.z" For 1987, a direct alloca-
tion of 50% of United Statesincurred research and development expenses
will be made to the United States. 2 Unless further legislation is adopted
in 1987, the full force of the existing regulations will become extant for
1988 and subsequent years. With the problem of chronic foreign tax
credit limitation facing most U.S. based taxpayers, the unabated applica-
tion of Treasury Regulation § 1.861-8(e)(3) is a grim prospect.
Canada, on the other hand, has invoked a series of incentives for the
encouragement of research activity. These incentives for research in-
clude a full 20% research and development credit, and an immediate
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8.
21 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, 26 U.S.C. § 861 (1986).
22 I.R.C. § 1216 (1986).
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write off for capital expenditures for new research facilities.23 In compar-
ison, the United States offers a 20% research and development credit
that is incremental.24 Moreover, the TRA 1986 carefully circumscribes
the definition of research and development so that the definition applica-
ble for deduction and foreign source allocation rules is more favorable
than that which will qualify for research and development credit
purposes.25
This suggests that future research and development programs
should be developed in Canada. For a U.S. firm that needs additional
research and development activity, contracting with a Canadian firm that
can qualify for these incentive programs should produce a lower after tax
cost. Even more attractive from a United States viewpoint would be the
possibility of contracting directly with a subsidiary in Canada. In that
situation, the possibility of benefiting from the profit on the contract is
present. This would bring down the cost of the effort and maintain the
confidentiality of the work done to a significant extent.
Another area that is of some interest is the impact of the TRA 1986
on the independence of the subsidiaries of United States concerns operat-
ing in Canada. For many years there has been a tendency in the Internal
Revenue Code to fragment items of income for the purposes of determin-
ing the foreign tax credit limitation. This tendency started in the 1960s
when the United States was concerned about "hot money" running to
Canada in order to take advantage of high interest rates and then the
interest would be repatriated to the United States under the protection of
foreign tax credits from other operations. A separate basket for third
party interest was created in the Foreign Investor's Tax Act of 1966.26
Since then, several separate baskets have been created.27 The most recent
Act continued this practice and now passive income received from third
parties generally will be a separate basket of income. This effectively de-
nies foreign tax credit relief for such items. This is a case of taxpayer
activity which optimizes the use of foreign tax credits through tax plan-
ning schemes. This brings on curative legislation that is quite harsh. Not
only is a separate basket created, but to the extent that the third party
interest bears a withholding tax of at least five percent, it is cast into a
separate basket for purposes of calculating the foreign tax credit limita-
tion.2 8 When the rules for allocating deductions against foreign source
income are taken into account, it is possible that a five percent or greater
withholding tax on gross interest payments could help shield other inter-
est income in the separate basket from tax. To ensure that taxpayers find
23 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. ch. 63, § 37(1)(a) & (b) (1970-71-72) as amended.
24 I.R.C. § 41 (1986).
25 I.R.C. § 41(d) (1986).
26 Foreign Investor's Tax Act of 1966, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1966).
27 E.g., I.R.C. § 907(a) (1954); 22 U.S.C. § 2601 (a) (1975) (Oil Related Income); Revenue Act
of 1971, 26 U.S.C. § 38 (1971) (DISC Income).
28 I.R.C. §§ 904(d)(1)(A-B), 904(d)(2)(A-B) (1986).
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no relief from this provision, the separate basket with a high withholding
tax was created. To slam the door even more firmly on potential tax
planning schemes, withholding taxes in companies in which the U.S.
shareholder has a shareholding of between 10-50% do not qualify as
taxes for purposes of the foreign tax credit.29
The implications of this for subsidiary corporations is that their abil-
ity to deal with independent third parties in businesses that may generate
separate basket income is going to be curtailed. For instance, it will be
more attractive for the U.S. parent to require that its foreign affiliates
minimize cash and let the parent use the cash than to let the subsidiary
lend cash out in the country of its operations. Because of the operation
of the investment in U.S. property rules, the method for transferring cash
is likely to be through dividends with the consequent effect of keeping
retained earnings in foreign subsidiary companies quite low. Does this
make them less attractive in the countries in which they reside? Will it
mean their operations and opportunities will be constrained?
Licensing third parties from such subsidiary companies will also be
relatively unattractive. As a a matter of fact, licensing third parties gen-
erally will be unattractive for U.S. corporations. This would seem to
lessen the value of the technology of U.S. corporations. More impor-
tantly, the flexibility of the subsidiaries is reduced by this legislation.
Will those negotiating treaties on behalf of the United States be in-
clined to let foreign countries with whom they negotiate hold withhold-
ing rates at levels of five percent or more just to ensure that the passive
income not only falls in the separate basket, but is also kicked out into
the high withholding basket for interest income? It is probably too early
to speculate on the impact of TRA 1986 as it relates to the treaty negoti-
ating posture of the U.S. Treasury Department. Concern is appropriate
if the abandonment of conventional thinking in the area of intercompany
pricing becomes more wide spread. This area is already one that is not
easily administered either by the affected governments or taxpayers. The
impetus to this activity that has flowed in some measure from the regula-
tions under § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code has formed a body of
rules that we are only now coming to understand. Radical departures
from those concepts will not make international tax administration any
easier.
CONCLUSION
The United States has probably enacted a tax measure that will in-
jure its balance of trade in more than an insubstantial way. U.S. based
firms can be expected to exercise greater control over their affiliates in
Canada, and elsewhere, because the separate baskets for limiting the ap-
plication of the foreign tax credit discourage the allowance of foreign
29 I.R.C. §§ 904(d)(2)(E)(ii) (1986).
Vol. 12:289 1987
8
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 12 [1987], Iss. , Art. 34
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol12/iss/34
White-TRADE AND THE TAX-REFORM ACT OF 1986
subsidiaries to participate in activities that generate those sorts of
income.
The views of U.S. Treasury regarding intercompany transactions
and their taxation in the international arena may be in a state of change
that should be a matter of concern to all those who are affected.
Canada may be in a position to take advantage of the poor position
of the United States. The largest risk from the Canadian point-of-view is
that it may be inclined to follow the U.S. model. Not only would that, in
some measure, curtail its potential advantage, but it may slow capital
formation and growth in the Canadian economy. That would seem to be
doubly bad policy for the Canadians. Some growth in the Canadian
manufacturing sector should occur as a result of the U.S. legislation.
This would be reflected in facilities built by Canadians to service the U.S.
market. In addition, some U.S. based concerns may increase their Cana-
dian presence to take advantage of the favorable disparity between the
capital cost recovery systems of the two countries.
Establishment of sales organizations in the United States by Cana-
dian firms may be encouraged as a result of the recent legislation. Sales
and service activity is encouraged by the low tax rate. Some commenta-
tors have even suggested that it may encourage firms to have functions,
such as accounting, done in the United States.
Favorable aspects of the Canadian law, as they relate to the encour-
agement of research and development activity should result in more ac-
tivity in Canada than would otherwise occur. Because the Canadian
system treats this activity more favorable than the United States, some
activity that would otherwise occur in the United States should flow to
Canada.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is a bad piece of national policy insofar
as the international trade implications are concerned. The U.S. balance
of trade will be injured by this legislation.
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